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Abstract We present a way to enjoy the power of SAT and SMT provers
in Coq without compromising soundness. This requires these provers to
return not only a yes/no answer, but also a proof witness that can be
independently rechecked. We present such a checker, written and fully
certified in Coq. It is conceived in a modular way, in order to tame the
proofs’ complexity and to be extendable. It can currently check witnesses
from the SAT solver ZChaff and from the SMT solver veriT. Experiments
highlight the efficiency of this checker. On top of it, new reflexive Coq
tactics have been built that can decide a subset of Coq’s logic by calling
external provers and carefully checking their answers.
1 Introduction
When integrating a technology like SAT/SMT solvers in type theoretical provers
like Coq, one classically has the choice between two ways, which Barendregt and
Barendsen [4] named the autarkic and the skeptical approach.
In the autarkic approach, all the computation is performed in the proof
system. In this case, this means implementing a whole, sufficiently efficient,
SAT/SMT solver as a Coq function, and then proving it correct. This approach
is followed in the Ergo-Coq effort [10].
In the skeptical approach, the external tool, here the SAT/SMT solver, is
instrumented in order to produce not only a yes/no answer but also a proof
witness, or a trace of its computation. It is the approach we follow here. The
main contribution of the paper is to propose a modular and effective checker for
SAT and SMT proof witnesses, written in Coq and fully certified.
In general, the choice between the autarkic and the skeptical approach de-
pends on the considered problem. Typically, when the problem is solved by a
greedy algorithm or something similar requiring no backtracking, the autarkic
approach is generally to be preferred. In the case of SAT/SMT solvers, where a
lot of time is devoted to actually finding the proof path, the skeptical approach
can have an edge in terms of efficiency. Another advantage of the skeptical ap-
proach may be that it requires much less effort to certify a checker only than
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a whole prover. A difficulty is that the external prover and the internal checker
have to speak a common language; indeed, finding the best possible format for
the proof witnesses is the crucial step which determines the whole architecture
of this prover-checker interaction.
Let us note that we see two benefits of this work. The first one being, as men-
tioned above, the addition to Coq of powerful and yet sound automation tactics.
A second one is that it gives a means to enhance the reliability of automatic
provers, by offering the possibility to have their results checked, a posteriori in
Coq.
One keypoint for success in computational proofs is making the best possible
usage of the, somewhat limited, computational power available inside the prover
(Coq). This concern underlies the whole work presented here. An important
advantage is the new addition to Coq of updatable arrays [3] which we use
extensively in this work.
A wholly different approach to the integration of SAT/SMT to provers is to
transform the proof witnesses into deductions. This approach has been taken for
the Isabelle and HOL Light provers. We provide some comparison in Section 7.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section recalls the basic princi-
ples of SAT and SMT solvers. Section 3 describes the modular structure of the
checker written in Coq; Sections 4 and 5 detail its different components, deal-
ing respectively with the SAT parts, and two specific theories. Part 6 describes
how the different parts are linked together in order to provide a practical tool.
Finally, Section 7 is devoted to benchmarks and comparison with other works.
The source code of the checker and information on its usage can be found
online [1].
2 The SAT and SMT problems
2.1 SAT solvers
SAT solvers deal with propositional formulas given in Conjunctive Normal Form
(CNF); they decide whether or not there exists an assignment of the variables
satisfying the formula. We recall basic definitions. A literal is a variable or its
negation, a clause is a disjunction of literals, noted l1∨· · ·∨ ln. Finally, a formula
in CNF is given by a finite set of clauses S, seen as their conjunction.
A valuation ρ associating a Boolean to each variable straightforwardly in-
duces an interpretation of a set of clauses ([[S]]ρ) as a Boolean. A set of clauses
S is satisfiable if and only if there exists a valuation ρ such that [[S]]ρ = ⊤.
Conversely, S is unsatisfiable if and only if for any valuation ρ, [[S]]ρ = ⊥.
Modern SAT solvers rely on variants of the DPLL algorithm which can be
customized to generate a proof witness [12]. The witness is:
– either an assignment of the variables to ⊤ and ⊥ in order to satisfy all the
clauses, in the case where the set of clauses is satisfiable;
– or a proof by resolution of the empty clause, in the case where the formula
is unsatisfiable.
We recall that the refutationally complete resolution rule is:
v ∨ C v¯ ∨D
C ∨D
where v is called the resolution variable. A comb tree is a tree where at least
one child of every inner node is a leaf. A comb tree of resolution rules is called
a resolution chain.
From the point of view of result certification, the case of unsatisfiability is the
more challenging one. The format used by most SAT solvers for proof witnesses
of unsatisfiability is a list of resolution chains. This list should be understood as
a shared representation of the resolution tree: each resolution chain derives a new
clause (that can be used later by other resolution chains), and the last resolution
chain should derive the empty clause. It corresponds exactly to a subset of the
learned clauses that the algorithm encountered during its run.
2.2 SMT solvers
SMT solvers decide an extension of the SAT problem in which positive literals
are not only Boolean variables but also atomic propositions of some first-order
theory (possibly multisorted). Given a signature Σ containing simple types, and
function and predicate symbols with their types, a theory T is a set of formulas
of type bool written using this signature, variables and logical connectives. Those
formulas are called theory lemmas.
The standard architecture for SMT solvers is an interaction between a SAT
solver and decision procedures for the theories [12]. The SAT solver generates
models and the theory solvers try to refute them. When a SAT model is con-
sistent with all the theories, the initial problem is found satisfiable. Otherwise,
a new clause corresponding to a theory lemma is added to the SAT problem in
order to rule out the model. The SAT solver can then be called again to gen-
erate another model. Since there are only a finite number of SAT models, this
enumeration eventually terminates. If the empty clause is derived by the SAT
solver, the initial problem is unsatisfiable.
In this setting, a proof witness for unsatisfiability is a resolution tree of the
empty clause where leaves are not only initial clauses but also theory lemmas.
To our knowledge, at least three existing SMT solvers can deliver informative
proof witnesses of this kind: Z3, CVC3 and veriT (some other solvers provide less
informative witnesses). Although there are some output format differences, each
of these three provers does return a resolution tree with theory lemmas in the
case of unsatisfiability. They also give witnesses for satisfiability.
3 A modular and efficient Coq checker for SAT and SMT
proof witnesses
We have developed a general framework to verify SAT and SMT proof witnesses
for unsatisfiability proofs. During the SAT/SMT process, new clauses are gener-
ated until reaching the empty clause. These new clauses are either propositional
consequences of the initial clauses, theory lemmas, or related to the CNF conver-
sion and to various simplifications. A small certificate is generated to explain how
each of the new clauses that are useful to obtain unsatisfiability was produced.
Our checker is defined by bringing together small checkers, each dedicated to
one aspect of the verification of the resolution tree (the propositional reasoning,
the theory lemmas of a given theory, the CNF conversion etc.). This modularity
is a key aspect of our work. Small checkers are then independent pieces of code
that can be composed in a very flexible way. Section 4.1 is dedicated to checking
resolution chains, Section 4.2 to checking CNF computation. For theory lemmas,
Section 5.2 describes what has been done for congruence closure and Section 5.3
for linear integer arithmetic. In each section, we present exactly the certificate
format, how the checker works and is proved correct. The actual connection
between Coq and the SAT and SMT provers is presented only later in Section 6.
The common aim underlying these different parts is preserving efficiency, in
time and space. The main difficulty is the very large number of clauses that
may need to be handled. We therefore strongly rely on the new persistent arrays
feature of Coq, described in [3]. Schematically, checkers can be understood as
sharing a global state, holding the current set of clauses, and implemented by an
array. One typical optimization will be to keep this array as small as possible,
by re-using a cell as soon as the clause it holds is known to be not used anymore
for further computations.
In order to achieve modularity, we restrict ourselves to a very lightweight
interface for the small checkers. Our implementation is based on four main data
types: S, C, clauseId, and scertif. The first one, S, represents the state. Initially,
the only clause in the state is the singleton clause that contains the formula to
be proved unsatisfiable. The type for clauses is C. An element of type clauseId is
an identifier that refers to a clause. The get and set functions let us access and
modify the state and the main checker only needs to be able to check whether a
clause is empty, i.e it represents ⊥:
get : S → clauseId→ C set : S → clauseId→ C → S isFalse : C → bool
A small checker in our setting is just a Coq program that, given a state and a
small certificate c, returns a new clause C. It is correct if the new clause that is
produced is a consequence of the state S:
for any interpretation ρ, [[S]]ρ ⇒ [[C]]ρ
The type scertif is an enumeration type that collects all the possible small cer-
tificates. Associated to this type, there is a dispatching function scheck that,
depending on the small certificate it receives, calls the appropriate checker.
Since small checkers just generate clauses, the only information we have to
provide when gluing together small certificates is where the new clauses have to
be stored. Finally, at the end, the initial formula should be proved unsatisfiable,
so the empty clause must have been derived. So, its actual location must be
given by the main certificate. The type of such certificate is then
certif := list (clauseId ∗ scertif) ∗ clauseId
The main checker is now trivially defined by
check S cert =
let (l, k) := cert in
let S′ := List.fold left (fun S (p, c)⇒ set S p (scheck S c)) S l in
isFalse (get S′ k)
It takes an initial state S and a certificate cert and sequentially calls small
checkers to compute new clauses extending the state with the generated clauses.
Provided all small checkers are correct and the check returns true and since
satisfiability is preserved, reaching an absurd state implies that the initial state
was indeed unsatisfiable.
As hinted above, the get and set functions are built upon the persistent arrays
of Coq and one such array is used in the state to store clauses. clauseIds are thus
array indexes, i.e. 31-bit integers. So, access and update to the set of clauses are
performed in constant time. Since we use arrays, in the following, (get S n) is
written as S.[n].
It is very unlikely that a given SMT solver will output exactly our kind
of certificates. A pre-processing phase is required in order to translate proof-
witnesses generated by the SMT solver into our format. In particular, the precise
clause allocation that is required by our format is usually not provided by the
SMT solver. Finding out such an allocation is a post-processing seen from the
SMT solver, and a pre-processing seen from Coq. It involves techniques similar
to register allocation in compilation. First, the maximal number of clauses that
need to be alive at the same time is computed. Then, a cell is explicitly allocated
to each clause, in such a way that two clauses that need to be alive at the same
time do not share the same cell. In practice, this has a big impact on the memory
required to check a certificate.
4 Small checkers for SAT
4.1 A small checker for resolution chains
As explained in Section 2.1, the SAT contribution is represented in the proof
witness by chains of resolutions. The constructor (res certif [|n1; . . . ; ni |]) in
scertif represents these chains. Let R(C1, C2) be the resolution between the clause
C1 and the clause C2. Given this certificate and a state S, the corresponding
small checker iteratively applies resolution to eventually produce the new clause
R(. . . (R(S.[n1], S.[n2]), . . . ), S.[ni]).
This efficient treatment of resolution chains requires a careful encoding of
clauses and literals. First, we encode propositional variables as 31-bit integers.
We follow the usual convention reserving location 0 for the constant true, which
means that the interpretation of propositional variables ρ always comes with
the side-condition that ρ(0) = true. Literals are also encoded as 31-bit integers,
taking advantage of parity. The interpretation for literals is built such that:
[[l]]ρ = if even l then ρ(l/2) else ¬ρ(l/2).
The point being that parity check and division by two are very fast since they
are directly performed by machine integer operations as explained in [3].
Clauses are represented by lists of literals. The interpretation [[c]]ρ of a clause
c is then the disjunction of the interpretation of its literals. The interpretation
[[S]]ρ of a state S is defined as the conjunction of the interpretation of its clauses.
To give a concrete example, consider the interpretation of proposition vari-
ables: ρ(0) = true, ρ(1) = x, ρ(2) = y. If S = [| [2; 4]; [5]; [3; 4] |] we have
[[S]]ρ = [[ [2; 4] ]]ρ ∧ [[ [5] ]]ρ ∧ [[ [3; 4] ]]ρ = ([[2]]ρ ∨ [[4]]ρ) ∧ [[5]]ρ ∧ ([[3]]ρ ∨ [[4]]ρ)
= (ρ(1) ∨ ρ(2)) ∧ ¬ρ(2) ∧ (¬ρ(1) ∨ ρ(2)) = (x ∨ y) ∧ ¬y ∧ (¬x ∨ y)
In this setting, the interpretation of a set of clauses is always a CNF formula. A
proof of unsatisfiability of this formula is the following chain of resolutions
x ∨ y ¬y
x ¬x ∨ y
y ¬y
⊥
This corresponds in our format to certificate ([0, res certif [0; 1; 2; 1]], 0).
4.2 Small checkers for CNF computation
With our previous small checker, proof witnesses for SAT problems in CNF can
be checked in Coq. The next step is to be able to verify the transformation of
a formula into an equisatisfiable formula in CNF. This is usually done using a
technique proposed by Tseitin [14]. This involves generating a new variable for
every subterm of the formula; with these new variables, the CNF transformation
is linear. It is this idea that we are going to implement in our setting. Naming
subterms corresponds to a form of hash-consing. A hashed formula is either an
atom, true, false, or a logical connective. Sub-formulas of connectives are literals
(i.e., a variable or its negation):
Type hform =
| Fatom (a : atom) | Ftrue | Ffalse
| Fand (ls : array lit) | For (ls : array lit) | Fxor (l1 l2 : lit)
| Fimp(l1 l2 : lit) | Fite (l1 l2 l3 : lit) | Fiff (l1 l2 : lit) | Fdneg (l : lit).
Note that the connectives Fand and For are n-ary operators which allows a more
efficient subsequent computation. Note also that we have no primitive construc-
tor for negation, which has to be pushed to the literals (with little cost, using
the odd/even coding described above). However, double negation is explicit and
primitive, in order to represent the formula ¬¬x faithfully.
For computation, the state of the checker is extended with a new array ftable
containing the table of the hashed formulas. For example, the formula ¬((x ∧
y) ∨ ¬(x ∧ y)) can be encoded by the literal 9 using the formula table:
[|Ftrue; Fatom 0; Fatom 1; Fand [|2; 4|]; For [|6; 7|] |]
with the interpretation for atoms defined by ρA(0) = x, ρA(1) = y. Three things
are worth noticing. First, the sub-formula x∧y appears twice in the formula but
is shared in the table (at location 3); indeed, this representation allows maximal
sharing. Second, we have to ensure that our table does not contain infinite terms,
so our state can be interpreted. This is done by preserving some well-formedness
on the table: if a literal m appears in the formula stored at location n, we always
have m/2 < n. It is this condition that actually allows us to define the Boolean
interpretation [[f ]]ρA recursively over the formula f , where ρ is the interpretation
of the variables.
Finally, the tables always have Ftrue at location 0. The interpretation of
propositional variables of the previous section is simply defined as
ρ(n) = [[ftable.[n]]]ρA .
Tseitin identifies 40 generic tautology schemes used in the transformation
to CNF. In the case of our example ¬((x ∧ y) ∨ ¬(x ∧ y)), the transformation
invokes the following tautology ¬(A0 ∨ · · · ∨ Ai ∨ · · · ∨ An) ⇒ A¯i. For each of
these tautologies, we have written a specific test function which verifies that
the corresponding tautology can actually be applied. In this case, the certificate
is written (nor certif m i) and the corresponding checker verifies that S.[m] is
a singleton clause [k] with k being odd and that ftable.[k/2] is a disjunction
(For [|l1; . . . ; ln|]). If these conditions are met, it produces the clause [l¯i] if
i < n. If the verification fails, the true clause is returned. This trick of using the
true clause as default will be used for all the other small checkers.
The full certificate of unsatisfiability for our example is then:
([(1, nor certif 0 0); (0, nor certif 0 1); (0, res certif [|1; 0|]], 0).
The computation of the final set of clauses proceeds like this:
[| [9]; [0] |]
1,nor certif 0 0
 [| [9]; [7] |]
0,nor certif 0 1
 [| [6]; [7] |]
0,res certif [|1; 0|]
 [| [ ]; [7] |]
At the end, we find the empty clause at location 0, which ensures the initial
formula is unsatisfiable.
Let us finally remark that our format is compatible with lazy CNF trans-
formation and also that it is possible to delegate the CNF computation to the
SMT solver.
5 Small checkers for congruence closure and linear
arithmetic
5.1 Refining the term representation
In order to handle theories, we need to provide a proper representation for atoms.
Atoms can represent objects of different types, so we also need a proper repre-
sentation for types. Theories like EUF manipulate uninterpreted functions, so
we also need uninterpreted base types. Here is our representation:
Type btype = Tidx (n : int) | Tbool | TZ | . . .
Type cst = Zcst (n : Z) | . . .
Type op = Oidx (n : int) | Oeq (t : btype) | OZle | OZlt | OZplus | . . .
Type hatom = Avar (v : avar) | Acst (c : cst) | Aapp (o : op) (as : list atom).
As for formulas, our encoding uses a table atable, so the type atom is an abbre-
viation for int. A hashed atom is either a variable (Avar), a constant of a theory
(Acst), or an application of an operator to its arguments (list atom). Operators
are uninterpreted functions or predicates (Oidx), or a function (OZplus) or a
predicate (OZle) of a given theory. Base types are either uninterpreted (Tidx) or
a type of a given theory (TZ).
To illustrate our representation, let us consider the formula f x < 1 ∨ g (y +
1) < 1 over the Coq integer Z where the Coq type of x is α and is left uninter-
preted. We have the following tables:
ftable = [|Ftrue;Fatom 5;Fatom 7;For [|2; 4|]|]
atable = [|Avar 0; Avar 1; Acst (Z cst 1); Aapp (Oidx 0) [0]; Aapp OZplus [1; 2];
Aapp OZlt [3; 2]; Aapp (Oidx 1) [4]; Aapp OZlt [7; 2]|]
Interpreting types is easy. We just need a table ttable associating a Coq type
to every type index. We denote by [[T ]]t the interpretation of a base type T
with respect to this table. Interpreting atoms is more difficult, since we must
build well-typed Coq terms. In particular, different elements of the table may be
interpreted into different types. Therefore, our interpretation function returns
a dependent pair (T, v) where T has type btype and v has type [[T ]]t. The in-
terpretation of atoms [[A]] uses two tables. The first one (vtable) is a valuation
associating (T, v) to a variable index. The second one (otable) associates a pair
(([T1, . . . , Tn], T ), f) to an operator index, where Ti, T have type btype and f
has type [[T1]]t → . . . [[Tn]]t → [[T ]]t. With these tables, defining the interpretation
[[A]] is straightforward. We simply check that all applications are well-typed, if
not we return (Tbool, true). This makes our interpretation a total function. Here
are the three tables used by the interpretation for the previous example:
ttable = [|α|]
vtable = [|(Tidx 0, x); (TZ, y)|]
otable = [|(([Tidx 0],TZ), f); (([TZ],TZ), g)|]
The interpretation of atoms of the previous section is simply defined as ρA(a) =
[[atable.[a]]].
We need some side conditions on the different tables to be able to complete
the proof of our small checkers. First, the hashed atom contained at position k
of the atable should refer to atoms strictly smaller than k (this ensures that the
interpretation terminates). Second, the atable should only contain well-typed
hashed atoms with respect to vtable and otable. This last condition allows to
reject formulas like ¬(1 = true)∨¬(true = 2)∨ (1 = 2) which is correct from the
transitivity point of view but is interpreted in Coq by false ∨ false ∨ 1 = 2
5.2 A small checker to compute congruence closure
The theory of congruence closure is at the heart of all SMT solvers. In our
term representation, equality is represented as a binary operator (Oeq) that
is parameterised by the representation of the type on which equality operates.
Consider the proof of unsatisfiability of the formula ¬(f a = f b)∧ b = c∧ a = c,
which belongs to the congruence closure fragment. It creates the following tables:
ftable = [|Ftrue; Fatom 5; Fatom 6; Fatom 7; Fand [|3; 4; 6|];Fatom 8 |];
atable = [|Avar 0; Avar 1; Avar 2; Aapp (Oidx 0) [0]; Aapp (Oidx 0) [1];
Aapp (Oeq TZ) [3; 4]; Aapp (Oeq TZ) [1; 2];
Aapp (Oeq TZ) [0; 2];Aapp (Oeq TZ) [0; 1] |]
vtable = [| (TZ, a); (TZ, b); (TZ, c) |] otable = [| (([TZ], TZ), f) |] ttable = [| |]
where the formula is at location 4 of ftable. Note that location 5 is not necessary
to encode the formula but for its proof (the same thing happens for the location
8 of atable). This is explained later.
Our checker is only capable of producing clauses obtained by instantiating
one of these three theorems:
- transitivity: x1 6= x2 ∨ · · · ∨ xn−1 6= xn ∨ x1 = xn
- function congruence: x1 6= y1 ∨ · · · ∨ xn 6= yn ∨ f x1 . . . xn = f y1 . . . yn
- predicate congruence: x1 6= y1 ∨ · · · ∨ xn 6= yn ∨¬P x1 . . . xn ∨P y1 . . . yn
The small certificates are (eq trans c), (eq congr c) and (eq congr pred c) where
c represents the candidate clause to be produced. This explains why the tables
of our previous example had more than the atoms of the initial formula. They
also contain the atoms of the theory lemmas. The small checkers for these certifi-
cates only have to verify that c is indeed an instantiation of their corresponding
theorem. For instance, the small checker for eq trans [l1; . . . ; ln; l] verifies that:
– l is even and each li is odd;
– l/2 refers to Aapp (Oeq t) [a; b] and each li/2 refers to Aapp (Oeq ti) [ai; bi];
– a equals a1, b equals bn and for 1 ≤ i < n, ai equals bi+1.
Note that all the equality tests over atoms are just equalities over integers thanks
to our maximal sharing of atoms. Furthermore, we do not need to check type
equality between the ti since the small checkers assume that the atom table is
always well-typed.
Our modular checker can combine these three simple rules and the resolution
checker to derive the empty clause from an unsatisfiable formula. In our example,
the checker starts with the initial formula ¬(f a = f b) ∧ b = c ∧ a = c. After
evaluating the part of the certificate dedicated to CNF computation, the state
contains the clauses [|[3]; [4]; [6]; [0]; [0]|] and what is left to be evaluated is
([(3, eq trans [5; 7; 10]); (4, eq congr [11; 2]); (0, res certif[|3; 1; 2; 4; 0|])], 0).
The computation then proceeds like this:
[|[3]; [4]; [6]; [0]; [0]|]
3,eq trans [5;7;10]
 [|[3]; [4]; [6]; [5; 7; 10]; [0]|]
4,eq congr [11;2]
 
[|[3]; [4]; [6]; [5; 7; 10]; [11; 2]|]
0,res certif[|3;1;2;4;0|]
 [|[]; [4]; [6]; [5; 7; 10]; [11; 2]|]
5.3 A small checker for linear arithmetic
The tactic lia [5] of Coq proves any valid formula of linear arithmetic. It already
contains a checker based on Farkas’ certificates:
lia check : lia formula→ lia certif → bool,
Note that lia uses a different representation (lia formula). It also provides a
proof of correction for this checker. We choose to use lia check to build a small
checker for our modular interface. Thus, the small certificate for linear arithmetic
is simply (lia certif c F ) where c is the candidate clause and F of type lia certif.
In order to validate the clause c, the small checker first calls the function
lia formula of to translate c into an equisatisfiable formula f of type lia formula,
and then calls (lia check f F ). The correctness of this small checker relies on the
correctness of the lia checker and on the correctness of our translation.
5.4 The simplifier small checker
For more efficiency, most SMT solvers use on-the-fly term rewriting and simpli-
fication and do not give proof witnesses for these simplifications. Furthermore,
sometimes the formula needs to be preprocessed before being sent to an exter-
nal solver, again for efficiency reasons. In consequence, the formula f ′ proved
by the proof witness can be slightly different from the initial formula f one
wanted to prove. We have thus developed a dedicated small checker that verifies
that a formula f is equivalent to f ′. Our checker is able to prove equivalence
through associativity of conjunction and disjunction, double negation, symmetry
of equality, and simple rewriting of linear inequations (such as: a ≥ b ≡ b ≤ a).
It is implemented by a simple simultaneous recursive descent of f and f ′. Only
the symmetry of equality requires some backtracking.
6 Building a Coq tactic
To build an actual tactic out of our certified checker, we follow the usual steps
for reflexive tactics. The first step is reification: given a formula f in Coq on
a decidable domain, we have to build 5 tables and a literal l, such that the
interpretation of l with respect to these tables is ¬f . The second step is to find
a certificate that shows that [l] is unsatisfiable. This is done by calling the SAT
or SMT solver. We need to translate the problem into the solver input format.
Then, the solver returns a proof witness, that we transform into a certificate.
During the first translation, we sometimes need to do some pre-processing.
For example, ZChaff only accepts CNF formulas, so the CNF transformation is
done before sending it. Also, the CNF transformation of veriT is more efficient if
disjunctions and conjunctions are considered as n-ary operators (and not binary
like in Coq), so we flatten the formula before sending it. The justification of this
pre-processing is the prelude of the certificate.
The transformation of proof witnesses into certificate requires more work.
We first need to update our tables so they contain all the formulas of the theory
lemmas. Second, we have to transform each step of the proof witness into a
sequence of small certificates. In the easiest cases, the solver gives exactly what
we expect. This is the case, for instance, of the resolution chains produced by
SAT solvers and the CNF transformation produced by veriT. In other cases, very
lightweight modifications are necessary. For instance, the format for congruence
closure of veriT automatically removes duplicates literals. It generates ¬x =
y ∨ f x x = f y y while our certificate expects ¬x = y ∨¬x = y ∨ f x x = f y y.
Finally, in the worst cases, we may have to rebuild completely the certificate.
This is the case for veriT where theory lemmas for linear arithmetic come without
justification. In this precise example, we use the external solver of lia to produce
the Farkas’ certificate.
Finally, the compactness of the certificate is very important. So, when it is
not done by the solver, we prune it by removing all the justifications of unused
clauses. It is during this phase that we compute the minimal required size of the
array of clauses and perform clause allocation.
This work results into two new Coq tactics called zchaff and verit .
7 Results and comparison with other works
7.1 Related works
The work presented here extends what is described in [3] in several ways. First,
we complemented the SAT checker with checkers for CNF computation, con-
gruence closure, differential logic and linear arithmetic. To do so with a great
modularity, the format of certificates has been rethought: the idea of small and
main checkers makes it easier to add new theories. Second, we can formally check
proof witnesses generated by the veriT solver, which combines all these theories.
Finally, we use our checker to enhance the automation of Coq by defining new
safe reflexive decision procedures.
Several SAT and SMT solvers have been integrated in LCF style interactive
theorem provers including CVC Lite in HOL Light [11], haRVey in Isabelle/HOL [8],
Z3 in HOL and Isabelle/HOL [6]. To our knowledge, our work is the first inte-
gration relying on proof witnesses in a proof assistant based on Type Theory.
In the following, we will focus on the comparison with proof reconstruction in
Isabelle/HOL of ZChaff [15] and Z3 [6] (this corresponds to the state-of-the-art).
We point out that comparison for theories has to be considered with care since
we do not use the same SMT solver.
Another approach is to write the SAT or SMT solver directly inside the
proof assistant and formally prove its correctness. This is the approach followed
in [10]. It has the advantage to validate the algorithms at work in the prover but
is sensitive to any change, any optimization in the proof search. We compare the
two approaches.
7.2 Experiments
All the experiments have been conducted on an Intel Quad Core processor with
2.66GHz and 4Gb RAM, running Linux. Our code which served for the experi-
ments is available online [1]. It requires the native version of Coq [7]. It represents
around 6, 000 lines of Coq code and 8, 000 lines of Ocaml code. The Coq code
for our shared term representation is about 1, 000 lines, the SAT part 1, 200, the
CNF part 1, 500, the EUF 600, the LIA part 1, 500 and the simplifier part 500.
The complete checker corresponds to 1, 000 lines of Coq code, the other 5, 000
are for specifications and proofs.
SAT verification We first compare our combination of the main checker with
the small checker of resolution chains for ZChaff in Coq with proof reconstruction
for ZChaff in Isabelle/HOL written by Alwen Tiu and Tjark Weber. We use
Isabelle 2009-1 (running with Poly/ML 5.2) and ZChaff 2007.3.12.
We run ZChaff on a database of 151 unsatisfiable industrial benchmarks from
SAT Race’06 and ’08 with a timeout of 300 seconds. These benchmarks range
from 300 to 2.3 million variables and from 1, 800 to 8.9 million clauses. When
ZChaff succeeds in the given time, it produces a proof witness whose size range
from 41Kb to 205Mb. In that case, we run our checker and the Isabelle/HOL
checker on it with a timeout of 300 seconds. Table 1 presents the number of
benchmarks solved by ZChaff, and among them, the number of proof witnesses
successfully checked by Isabelle/HOL and Coq. The times are the mean of the
times for the 57 benchmarks on which ZChaff, Coq and Isabelle/HOL all suc-
ceeded, in seconds. Errors in Isabelle/HOL were due to timeouts.
It appears that Coq can check all the proof witnesses given by ZChaff in the
given time. This is not surprising since our checker appears to be faster than
ZChaff itself. However, the Isabelle/HOL checker is slower than ZChaff, which
explains that only 72% of the proof witnesses can be checked without timeout.
The three curves on the left of Figure 1 present the number of benchmarks
solved along the time by ZChaff, Isabelle and Coq. It clearly shows that the Coq
checker is far faster verifying results than ZChaff is building them; the main time
consumed by our combination is taken by ZChaff. However, the limiting factor
of the ZChaff and Isabelle/HOL combination is Isabelle/HOL.
SMT verification We now compare our combination of the main checker with
the small checkers of resolution chains, CNF computation, congruence closure,
differential logic and linear integer arithmetic for veriT in Coq with proof recon-
struction for Z3 in Isabelle/HOL written by Sascha Bo¨hme and Tjark Weber. We
use Isabelle 2009-1 (running with Poly/ML 5.2), Z3 2.19 and the development
version of veriT.
We took a database of unsatisfiable industrial benchmark from the SMT-
LIB [2] for theories QF UF (congruence closure), QF IDL (differential logic)
and QF LIA (linear integer arithmetic). It is important to notice that veriT
is not completely proof producing for QF LIA, so we selected a subset of the
benchmarks where veriT returns either unknown or unsatisfiable with a proof
witness. On the one hand, we run veriT, followed by our Coq checker when veriT
succeeds. On the other hand, we run Z3, followed by the Isabelle/HOL checker
when Z3 succeeds. Each run has a timeout of 300 seconds. The mean of the
Figure 1: Experiments on industrial benchmarks
Solved ZChaff Isabelle/HOL checker Coq checker
# % Time # % Time # % Time
79 52 51.9 57 38 100. 79 52 17.5
Table 1: SAT benchmarks
Benchmarks Solved Z3 Solved veriT Isabelle/HOL checker Coq checker
Logic # # % Time # % Time # % Time # % Time
QF UF 1852 1834 99 2.5 1816 98 6.5 1775 96 25.8 1804 97 1.4
QF IDL 409 402 98 0.6 368 90 6.3 190 46 55.2 349 85 37.8
QF LIA 116 107 92 0.7 98 84 11.6 96 83 46.6 98 84 3.1
Table 2: SMT benchmarks
dplln zchaff
H7 28.0 0.2
H8 262.7 1.2
H9 - 1.6
H10 - 6.7
dplln zchaff
deb700 111.5 0.8
deb800 147.9 1.0
deb900 201.6 1.2
deb1000 260.4 1.5
cc verit
F (13, 5, 8) 0.5 0.1
F (25, 13, 1) 1.3 0.1
F (25, 15, 5) 0.5 0.2
F (25, 24, 24) 16.9 0.1
cc verit
D5 2.3 0.3
D8 24.9 1.1
D10 118.7 2.2
D15 - 45.7
Table 3: Comparison with Ergo in Coq
sizes of Z3 proof witnesses is 12Mb, and the mean of the sizes of veriT proof
witnesses is 7.7Mb. Table 2 presents the number of benchmarks solved by Z3 and
veriT, and among them, the number of proof witnesses successfully checked by
Isabelle/HOL and Coq. The times are the mean of the times for the benchmarks
on which Z3, veriT, Isabelle/HOL and Coq all succeeds, in seconds. Errors in Coq
were due to timeouts, and in Isabelle/HOL to timeouts and failures.
It appears that Coq can check a large part of the proof witnesses given
by veriT (98.6%) whereas Isabelle/HOL can check 88.0% of the proof witnesses
given by Z3. As a result, even if Z3 can solve more benchmarks than veriT,
the number of benchmarks solved by veriT combined with Coq is greater than
the number of benchmarks solved by Z3 combined with Isabelle/HOL. Moreover,
our combination is faster than the combination of Z3 with Isabelle/HOL. These
results can be explained in great part by the fact that veriT gives much smaller
proof witnesses. For instance, for logic QF IDL, in average, Z3 proof witnesses
are 7.9 times bigger than veriT proof witnesses in terms of storing. The quality of
veriT proof witnesses strengthens the fact we use it, even if there exists currently
more performing SMT solvers. We have been told that the limitation of proof
witnesses for LIA should disappear soon.
The four curves on the right of Figure 1 present the number of benchmarks
solved along the time by the solvers and their combinations. They clearly indicate
that our approach compares well with respect to [6].
Tactics We compare our zchaff and verit tactics with the reflexive tactics
dplln and cc from Stephane Lescuyer’s SMT solver Ergo written in Coq. To do
so, we use the same formulas that are presented in Section 11.2 of [10]:
– for SAT:
• the famous pigeon hole formulas which are unsatisfiable
• the de Bruijn formulas: debn = ∀x0, . . . , x2n, (x2n ↔ x0) ∨
2n−1∨
i=0
(xi ↔ xi+1)
– for EUF:
• the formulas FP (n,m, k) = ∀fx, fn(x) = x → fm(x) = x → fk(x) = x
which are true for any n,m, k such that k is a multiple of gcd(n,m)
• the formulas Dn =
∀f,
(
n−1∧
i=0
(xi = yi ∧ yi = f(xi+1)) ∨ (xi = zi ∧ zi = f(xi+1))
)
→ x0 = f
n(xn)
Results are presented in Table 3. Times are in seconds. We see that our zchaff
and verit tactics here clearly outperform dplln and cc. This is not surprising
since ZChaff and veriT have more efficient algorithms than Ergo. Note it may
be difficult to change Ergo’s algorithm since it would involve redoing many cor-
rectness proofs; the certificate approach is more flexible here. If we store proof
witnesses, zchaff and verit get faster at rather small storage cost: in our ex-
amples, the largest proof witness is 41Mb large for D15.
Regarding other existing Coq tactics, zchaff is far faster than tauto, and
verit is similar to congruence. However, these latter ones do not solve the
same goals, since verit can solve goals including congruence and propositional
reasoning, and congruence can deal with inductive data-types.
8 Conclusion and future works
Compared to what the authors call “proof reconstruction” in [6], what we have
presented here is much closer to program verification. We have developed in-
side Coq a program that checks traces generated by SAT and SMT solvers. A
particular care has been given to the efficiency of the data representation for
clauses and atoms. Even with the limited computing power available inside Coq,
the checker is rather efficient: it is able to check in reasonable time huge proof
witnesses coming from challenging benchmarks and it compares well with state
of the art implementations in Isabelle/HOL.
From the methodology point of view, what we have done is very close to [13].
In this work, the authors have developed a checker for SMT proofs using LFSC.
The main difference is that they delegate the verification of the SAT part to an
external checker (written in C++). Here, we do everything within the logic.
We also took a special care in being generic: for example the same checker
is used for ZChaff and veriT. This relies on the generic format we use after
translating proof witnesses into certificates. So we expect the checker to be easily
extensible. For the moment, veriT is the only SMT solver that is connected with
Coq. We hope that our format of certificate could also be used successfully to
connect to other proof producing solvers. Our next step is to integrate Z3.
The checker has also been proved correct. Using the technique of proof by
reflection, it made it possible to derive a safe and automatic proof procedure
within Coq. Formulas usually proved in Coq are rather small so a far less effi-
cient checker could have been sufficient. Still, we believe that our work opens
interesting new perspectives of using brute force methods for doing proof with
Coq automatically. For example, one could encode the small problem she/he
has to prove as a huge Boolean formula that our SAT tactic can solve instanta-
neously.
Surprisingly the difficult part of this work was more the actual design of the
certificate and obtaining a good computational behaviour for the checker than
performing the correctness proofs. This is largely due to the fact that we are not
proving the full functional correctness of the checker. We are just proving that if
the checker replies true, the theorem is valid. This makes a big difference for the
proof effort. This reduces drastically the size of the invariants we had to prove
and clearly makes the proof of such a large piece of code tractable in Coq.
For future works, our priority is clearly to increase the expressiveness of the
formulas we can deal with. In particular, if we want our tool to be widely used
by the Coq community, being able to deal with quantified formulas and user-
defined functions is a must-have. For quantifiers, it has not been done yet mostly
because the current version of veriT does not produce proof witnesses. Though,
this should be available in the next version of the system. For definitions, more
work has to be done since the type system of Coq is more powerful than the
one proposed by the SMT-LIB standard. Other extensions we envision concern
non-linear arithmetic, arrays and bit vectors.
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